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THE MODIFICATION OF EQUITABLE DECREES IN
INSTITUTIONAL REFORM LITIGATION: A
COMMENTARY ON THE SUPREME COURT'S
ADOPTION OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S FLEXIBLE
TEST
David I. Levine*
INTRODUCTION

In the nearly forty years that have passed sinceBrown v.
Board of Education1 was decided, institutional reform litigation
2
has become almost commonplace, especially in federal courts.
In institutional reform litigation, plaintiffs (usually using the
class action device) 3 seek long-term reform of the policies and
conditions in government-operated institutions through the use
of equitable decrees.4 The experience of many courts with such
decrees, whether issued as ordinary judicial decrees or as consent decrees, 5 has been that they are broad in scope and long* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. The author thanks David Jung, Evan Lee and David Schoenbrod for their helpful comments.
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I) and 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown I1).
2 For example, there are over 500 local school districts currently operating under
court orders to desegregate, and prisons in over 40 states are under judicial supervision
due to overcrowding and other unconstitutional conditions. David 0. Stewart, No Exit:
Supreme Court Finds No Easy Path to Terminate Structural Injunctions, 78 ABA. J.
49 (1992). See also Wayne N. Welsh, The Dynamics of Jail Reform Litigation in California Counties, 26 LAw & Soc'y REv. 591 (1992) (almost one-third of jails in the United
States with populations of over 100 prisoners currently under court orders to alleviate
unconstitutional conditions).
2 FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
There is a mass of legal literature on institutional reform litigation. See, e.g.,
DAVID SCHOENBROD ET AL., REMEDIES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE (1990); David L Levine, The
Authority for the Appointment of Remedial Special Masters in Federal Institutional
Reform Litigation: The History Reconsidered, 17 UC. DAvis L, REV. 753 (1984).
5 A consent decree is a negotiated settlement of a case brought in equity that is
enforced through the court's power to enforce equitable decrees or orders. Thus, a consent decree traditionally has been treated as possessing characteristics of both a longterm contract between the parties and a judicial decree. See, e.g., Firefighters Local
Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984) (treating a consent decree as both); United
States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 236 n.10 (1975) ("consent decrees
and orders have attributes both of contracts and of judicial decrees"). See generally
Symposium, Consent Decrees: Practical Problems and Legal Dilemmas, 1987 U CHL
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lasting in effect. As a result, over the years of judicial supervision, it is not uncommon for parties to seek modification of the
decrees in light of subsequent developments.'
7
Since everyone's crystal ball inevitably becomes cloudy, it
might seem natural for courts to allow modifications generously.
Indeed, rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly provides that "the court may relieve a party ... from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:..
. (5) ... it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application."" The rule, however, has not always
been interpreted very generously.9
LEGAL F. 1.

For collections of cases where parties have sought modifications, see Lloyd C. Anderson, Implementation of Consent Decrees in Structural Reform Litigation, 1986 U.
ILL. L. REV. 725; Thomas J. Andre, Jr., The CollateralConsequences of SEC Injunctive
Relief: Mild Prophylactic or Perpetual Hazard?, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 625; Timothy
Stoltzfus Jost, From Swift to Stotts and Beyond: Modification of Injunctions in the
Federal Courts, 64 TEx. L. REV. 1101 (1986); Karen Keeble, Note, JudicialModification
of Consent Judgments in InstitutionalReform Litigation, 50 BROOK. L. REV. 657 (1984);
Thomas M. Mengler, Consent Decree Paradigms:Models Without Meaning, 29 B.C. L.
REv. 291 (1988); Stacey L. Murphy, Note, Modification of Consent Decrees in Institutional Reform Litigation: A Return to the Swift Standard, 8 REv. LITIG. 203 (1989);
Maimon Schwarzshild, Public Law by Private Bargain: Title VII Consent Decrees and
the Fairnessof Negotiated InstitutionalReform, 1984 DUKE L.J. 887; Steven R. Shapiro,
The Modification of Equitable Decrees: A Critical Commentary, 50 BROOK. L. REV. 433
(1984); Marc I. Steinberg, SEC and Other PermanentInjunctions-Standardsfor Their
Imposition, Modification and Dissolution, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 27 (1980); Harvard Law
Review Association, The Modification of Consent Decrees in InstitutionalReform Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1020 (1986) [hereinafter Modification of Consent Decrees].
" Professor Timothy Jost has aptly described the situation:
Because the injunction is necessarily a static... response to a dynamic evolving problem, over time it almost inevitably becomes less responsive to the
problem it addresses ....
The future tricks the court; the injunction, the
court's now outdated prediction, plods off into irrelevancy, leaving the beneficiary bereft of protection or the obligor subject to oppression.
Jost, supra note 6, at 1103-04.
1 FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b). For background on this portion of rule 60(b), which codified
equitable procedure of long-standing duration, see 7 JAMES W. MOORE ET. AL., MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE
60.26[4] (2d ed. 1992); 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2863 (1973). See also Mary Kay Kane,
Relief from Federal Judgments: A Morass Unrelieved by a Rule, 30 HASTINoS L.J. 41
(1978); Theodore R. Mann, Note, History and Interpretation of Federal Rule 60(b) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,25 TEmP. L.Q. 77 (1951); James W. Moore & Elizabeth B. A. Rogers, Federal Relief From Civil Judgments, 55 YALE L.J. 623 (1946).
' See, e.g., Jost, supra note 6, at 1111 n.74 (citing cases that "have considered requests for modification much as they would view collateral attacks on judgments not
involving injunctions"); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 8, § 2863, at 208 n.10 (1973) (citing cases where, "[b]ecause the standard is an exacting one, many applications for relief.
'
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Over time, courts have taken one of two basic approaches to
modification requests. The first approach, developed over sixty
years ago, set a high standard: the "grievous wrong" test. 0 Many
commentators contended subsequently that a different approach
was needed for certain contexts, especially institutional reform
litigation. For these situations, some courts have applied an easier standard over the past decade: the "flexible" test."
Each test has a judicial parent with a top-notch pedigree:
the grievous wrong test is the child of Justice Benjamin Cardozo 1 2 and the flexible test for institutional reform litigation is
Judge Henry Friendly's offspring.1 3 While each test has had its
critics, 4 Judge Friendly's version of the flexible test has met
particularly stern criticism, much of it coming from authors
writing in the pages of the Brooklyn Law Review (the "Brooklyn
critics"). 15
The Supreme Court recently addressed the question of
which standard should apply to modification requests in institutional reform litigation.' 6 In Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County
are denied").
'o The test takes its name from a phrase used in United States v. S%,Aft & Co., 286
U.S. 106, 119 (1932) ("Nothing less than a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by
new and unforseen conditions should lead us to change what was decreed after years of
litigation with the consent of all concerned.').
11The paradigm case taking this approach in the institutional reform context is
New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915 (1983).
'2See, e.g., Milton Handler & Michael Ruby, Justice Cardo:o, One-Ninth of the
Supreme Court, 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 235, 245 (1988) (Justice Cardozo's opinion in Staift
has been "regarded as the fountainhead of all learning on the modification of consent
decrees.").
" See, e.g, Murphy, supra note 6, at 230 (calling Judge Friendly "the champion" of
the flexible test).
14 See supra note 4. One observer has been especially harsh on Satift. See 2 MILroN
HANDLER, TWENTY-FivE YEARS OF ANTITRUST 943 (1973) (portion of opinion "defies common sense"); Handler & Ruby, supra note 12, at 250 ("disastrous effect on the law governing modification of consent decrees").
1" See Shapiro, supra note 6, at 433; Keeble, supra note 6, at 657 [hereinafter the
Brooklyn critics]. Other commentators criticizing the flexible test rely heavily on the
Brooklyn critics. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 6, at 203.
16The case is part of a larger effort on the part of the Supreme Court to create
standards for institutional reform decrees. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S.Ct. 1430
(1992); Board of Education of Oklahoma City Schools v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991). See
David L Levine, The Latter Stages of Enforcement of Equitable Decrees: The Course of
Institutional Reform Cases After Dowell, Rufo and Freeman, 20 HAsMos CO.;sT LQ
(1993) (forthcoming).
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Jail,17 the Justices relied heavily on Judge Friendly's opinion in
New York State Association for Retarded Children v. Carey1 8 as
the basis for adopting the flexible test in this context. This Commentary reviews the development of both tests, including the
Supreme Court's apparent rejection of the flexible test just one
year after Carey was decided in Firefighters Local Union No.
1784 v. Stotts.1 9 The Commentary then asse.sses the Court's recent adoption of the flexible test for institutional reform litigation, particularly in light of the points raised by the Brooklyn
20
critics in response to Carey, the key precedent for Ru/o.
Partisan readers of the Brooklyn Law Review will be disheartened to learn that the Brooklyn critics were not cited by
name in Rufo. However, careful comparison of Carey and Rufo
shows that the Supreme Court's Rufo decision avoided most of
the shortcomings the critics had identified in Judge Friendly's
Carey opinion. Despite the merits of Rufo, unfortunately, the
Court has created the risk of unnecessary confusion in lower
courts by failing to discuss two important matters in full. First,
the Court did not explain why it embraced the flexible test in
Rufo after it had seemingly rejected it in Stotts. Without such
an explanation, lower courts will not know which precedent to
follow. Second, although the Rufo majority invoked Carey frequently, the Court made no attempt to explain that its version
of the flexible test actually differed significantly from that of
Judge Friendly. This failure may lead lower courts to conclude
wrongly that Carey is a reliable guide to the Supreme Court's
approach to modifications in institutional reform litigation. If, as
a result, lower courts follow Carey blindly, they may make the
same errors identified by the Brooklyn critics.
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE "GRIEVOUS

A.

WRONG"

TEST

Justice Cardozo Decides United States v. Swift & Co.

Justice Cardozo established the basic modern standards for
evaluating any request to modify an injunction or consent decree
in his 1932 opinion for the Court in United States v. Swift &
112 S. Ct. 748 (1992).
's 706 F.2d 956 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915 (1983); see supra note 11 and
17

accompanying text.
,9 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
20 112 S. Ct. at 748.
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Co.2 Swift arose from an antitrust consent decree entered in
1920 against the five largest meat packers in the country.22 The
defendants had promised in the decree not to deal in or distribute a variety of food products, including meat at the retail
level and over 100 other non-meat foods and groceries. 23 Beginning in 1922, the defendants engaged in a string of legal maneuvers in an attempt to avoid the decree's constraints." In 1930
two of the defendants moved once again to modify the decree,
claiming that the food industry had changed substantially in the
ten years since the decree had been agreed upon.25 After the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia granted the 'requested
modifications,28 the United States, joined by associations of
wholesale grocers, appealed.27
Justice Cardozo's opinion clarified many issues concerning
the trial court's power to modify an injunction or consent decree. He determined that a court had the inherent power to
21 286 U.S. 106 (1932). The vote was 4-2, with three justices not participating in the
decision because of their roles in the case before being appointed to the Court. Comment, The Packer Consent Decree, 42 YALE L.J. 81, 91 n.44 (1932)[hereinafter Packer
Consent Decree]. Swift was Justice Cardozo's second Supreme Court opinion. It was argued in his first week on the bench. Handler & Ruby, supra note 12, at 239, 244.
2 For fuller descriptions of the long course of the litigation, see Owse4 Fiss, IN.UcTIONS 325-99 (1st ed. 1971); Jost, supra note 6, at 1107-11; see also Packer Consent Decree, supra note 21, at 81.
2 Swift, 286 U.S. at 110-12.
21 Id. at 112-13. In addition to activity in the lower courts, the Supreme Court itself
had already turned down two challenges to the decree before this case. See Swift & Co.
v. United States, 276 U.S. 311 (1928); United States v. California Coop. Canneries, 279
U.S. 553 (1929). Justice Cardozo made it clear that he took a dim view of these attempts.
Swift, 286 U.S. at 112 ("[T]he expectation would have been reasonable that a decree
entered upon consent would be accepted by the defendants... as a definitive adjudication setting controversy at rest.").
Professor Douglas Laycock has noted that the defendants fought vigorously against
the decree from the very first because it turned out that they had made a poor prediction
in a crucial case then pending before the Supreme Court. In United States v. United
States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920), which was handed down just two days after the
decree in Swift was entered, the Court settled a previously open question of antitrust law
in a way that would have favored the Swift defendants. DOUGLAS LAYcocJK. MODERN

AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 1029-30 (1985).
25 Professor Jost points out that the defendants' goal in this motion to modify-obtaining the right to enter the retail grocery market-would have been their legal
right in the absence of the decree because this was a market that they had not unlawfully dominated or in which they had engaged in restraint of trade. Jest, supra note 6, at
1109.

26 286 U.S. at 106.

" Id. at 109.
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modify its own decree, 28 whether or not the decree provided expressly for future modification.29 Moreover, because the entry of
the decree was "a judicial act," Justice Cardozo held that the
court could modify the decree, whether it had been entered after
a trial on the merits or as part of a settlement with the consent
of the parties.3 0 Although the decree had certain aspects of a
contract governing prospective behavior, it did not bind3the
par1
ties in quite the same way as would a private contract.
Even as he confirmed that the court had the power to modify the decree, Justice Cardozo established a difficult standard
for parties seeking -the exercise of that power:
There is need to keep in mind steadily the limits of inquiry proper to
the case before us. We are not framing a decree. We are asking ourselves whether anything has happened that will justify us now in
changing a decree .... We are not at liberty to reverse under the guise
of readjusting ....

The inquiry for us is whether the changes [in the

grocery business] are so important that the dangers, once substantial,
have become attenuated to a shadow. No doubt the defendants will be
better off if the injunction is relaxed, but they are not suffering hardship so extreme and unexpected as to justify us in saying that they are
the victims of oppression. Nothing less than a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions should lead us to
change what was decreed after years of litigation with the consent of
all concerned. 2

Under this standard, commonly referred to as the "grievous
wrong" test, the court rebuffed the meatpackers' motion to mod-

28 Before Swift, it was unresolved whether an injunction was modifiable or whether
it should be treated as a final judgment that was only subject to review on appeal. See
Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARv. L. REV. 994, 1080-81 (1965) (citing
cases).
29

"If the reservation had been omitted, power there still would be by force of prin-

ciples inherent in the jurisdiction of the chancery. A continuing decree of injunction di-

rected to events to come is subject always to adaptation as events may shape the need."
Swift, 286 U.S. at 114.

1o Id. at 115.

31 "[The parties' consent] was not an abandonment of the right to exact revision in
the future, if revision should become necessary in adaptation to events to be." Id.
32 Id. at 119 (emphasis added). One noteworthy feature of this section of Justice
Cardozo's opinion is the absence of citation to any authority. Virtually all of the passages
in the opinion that make determinations regarding the law of modification are similarly
devoid of authority. For discussion of a radically different earlier draft of Justice Cardozo's opinion, which would have had the court finding for the meat packers and adopting a significantly more flexible standard for modifications, see Handler & Ruby, supra
note 12, at 241; Jost, supra note 6, at 1111 n.73.
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ify the injunction. Moreover, under the grievous wrong test, federal courts, including the Supreme Court, kept the decree in effect against the meat packers for another fifty years."
B.

The Inconsistent Application of Swift

Perhaps because a jurist of the eminence of Justice Cardozo
wrote the opinion or perhaps because in the quoted paragraph
he crafted some of his more memorable phrases," many lower
courts have interpreted Swift stringently.30 The leading case

taking the strict approach is Humble Oil & Refining Co. v.
American Oil Co.36 In an opinion written by then-Judge Harry

Blackmun, the Eighth Circuit refused to modify a thirty-yearold injunction that had allocated the use of the petroleum trademark "Esso." In Judge Blackmun's view, the party seeking modification had to "provide close to an unanswerable case ...
[C]aution, substantial change, unforeseenness, oppressive hardship, and a clear showing are the requirements. 37 Other lower
courts have followed this lead, even in situations where a strict
approach seems terribly harsh, if not unjust.38
The Supreme Court has been inconsistent in its approach to

The decree was not finally dissolved until 1981. United States v. Swift & Co.,
1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,464 (N.D. IlL 1981).
, See Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inn, 645 F.2d 239, 245 (4th Cir. 1981) (Phillips,
J., dissenting) ("Inevitably also given the authorship courts have sometimes been
tempted to ascribe to several felicities of phrase.., a talismanic significance that, with
all deference, I suggest the author of The Nature of the Judicial Process would never
have claimed for them.").
" See, e.g., Modification of Consent Decrees, supra note 6, at 1023-24 (describing a
1960 opinion, United States v. Swift & Co., 189 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. I1.1980), aff'd mem.,
367 U.S. 909 (1961), as "[p]erhaps the starkest example of judicial unwillingness to grant
even modest modifications in the face of substantially changed circumstances"). Under
this rigid interpretation of Swift, the 1920 decree was not finally dissolved until 1981.
United States v. Swift & Co., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) E64,464 (N.D. 111. 1981). Not all
lower courts have seen Swift so rigidly. See, e.g., Jost, supra note 6, at 1113-21 (reviewing cases taking flexible approaches under Swift); 11 WRIGHT & MILuR. supra note 8,
§ 2863, at 208-11 (same).
36 405 F.2d 803 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 905 (1969).
" 405 F.2d at 813.
1"See, e.g., Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inn, 645 F.2d 239 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1053 (1981) (court refused to modify injunction that prohibited defendant from
indicating that its name was registered as a trademark, even though mark had been established in patent court after initial judgment); Leigh Ann Galbraith, Note, Injunction
Modification Standards:Uniformity v. Flexibility, 39 WAs & LEE L, RE 490, 492-501
(1982) (criticizing Holiday Inn decision as too harsh).
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the modification question."9 To give just one example,40 in a

later opinion in United States v. Swift &

C0.41

the Court sum-

marily affirmed a refusal to modify the Swift decree. The lower
court had based its refusal largely on Cardozo's rigid phrases,
even though another twenty-five years had passed since the orig42
inal opinion and market conditions had changed dramatically.
Conversely, in an opinion issued just weeks before, Railway Employees v. Wright,43 the Court relied heavily on Swift in holding
that it was an abuse of discretion for a trial court to refuse to
modify a consent decree after Congress amended the statute,
which was the basis for the decree.4 4
In 1968 the Court undertook its first full re-examination of
Swift in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.40
United Shoe, like Swift, was an antitrust case. Unlike Swift,
where private defendants attempted to modify a consent decree,
United Shoe concerned an attempt by the United States as
plaintiff to modify an injunction issued by the trial court after a

3, Some commentators have been less charitable:

No one serious about defining a district court's task in interpreting a consent
decree should look to the Supreme Court for guidance. Because its stated view
on interpretation has shifted with the merits of each case, the Court has
charted all the possibilities and fixed its sights on none of them. Consequently,
the Court has said nothing useful for lower courts, unless one thinks providing
a grab-bag of options is useful.
Mengler, supra note 6, at 299-300.
40 Needless to say, there are others. Compare Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 316
U.S. 556 (1942) (granting government's request for modification to extend time decree
would be effective) with Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 335 U.S. 303 (1948) (denying
government's request for modification to extend time because an identical decree arising
from the same litigation would be effective). See also Note, Flexibility and Finality in
Antitrust Consent Decrees, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1303, 1313 (1967) ("[W]hatever liberalization one reads into Chrysler must be largely read out of Ford six years later") [hereinafter Antitrust Consent Decrees]. But see Mengler, supra note 6, at 298-99 n.61 (although
Swift was not cited in Ford, the automobile cases were factually distinguishable from
each other).
41367 U.S. 909 (1961).
42 See Antitrust Consent Decrees, supra note 40, at 1310-11 (describing changed
conditions).
43 364 U.S. 642 (1961).
" The Court found an abuse of discretion even though Congress simply amended
the Railway Labor Act to permit (but not require) union shops; the consent decree had
enjoined the railroad and union from requiring a union shop, which reflected the thenexisting law. Id. at 644. Thus, the injunction did not require unlawful behavior on the
part of the defendants; its continuance would simply prohibit them from doing something that was now permitted.
5 391 U.S. 244 (1968).
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full hearing on the merits. The trial court denied the motion on
the grounds that the government had failed to meet Swift's test
for modification. 46 Writing for the Court, Justice Fortas emphasized that Justice Cardozo's decision had been framed in the
context of defendants who sought "not to achieve the purposes
of the provisions of the decree, but to escape their impact.

47

In

remanding for reconsideration of the government's petition to
modify, Justice Fortas made it clear that if the trial court's original order had not been effective in remedying the antitrust violations," it had the power and the obligation to modify the order so that the federal antitrust laws would be enforced.49
Although the Court opened the way for a modification, Professor
Jost has noted that United Shoe is ambiguous precedent because it was unclear which of the important factual differences
that distinguished it from Swift really was of greatest doctrinal
importance."
The Court next gave detailed attention to modifications in
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts51 In 1980 the trial
court entered a consent decree in which the City of Memphis,
Tennessee, committed itself to certain hiring and promotion
goals with respect to African-American employees in its fire department. In 1981 the City announced that it would have to layoff some employees due to unexpected budget shortfalls and
that it would use a "last-hired, first-fired" system for the layoffs.
At the plaintiff's request, the district court issued a preliminary
injunction which modified the consent decree to make the impact of the layoffs less severe on the plaintiffs.2 The Sixth Cir'6United

States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 266 F. Supp. 328, 329-30 (D. Mass.

1967).
47 391 U.S. at 249. "Swift teaches that a decree may be changed upon an appropriate showing, and it holds that it may not be changed in the interest of the defendants if
the purposes of the litigation as incorporated in the decree . . . have not been fully
achieved." Id. at 248.
48 The case was settled subsequently by a new consent decree. United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 1969 Trade Cas. (CCH) 72,688 (D. Mass. 1969).
"' United Shoe, 391 U.S. at 251-52; see also Note, Requests by the Government for

Modification of Consent Decrees, 75 YALE L.J• 657 (1966) (discussing issue before United

Shoe).
10 Jost, supra note 6, at 1024-25 (citing and assessing alternative interpretations);

see also Modification of Consent Decrees,supra note 6, at 1028 ("lower courts' responses
...

present a confusing mix of doctrinal analysis").
51 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
52 Id. at

567.
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cuit affirmed the issuance of the preliminary injunction, 3 but
the Supreme Court reversed.
Despite the apparent similarities to the facts of United
Shoe-both cases involved plaintiffs attempting to effectuate
the general purposes of the respective decrees-Justice White's
opinion for the majority took a surprisingly strict approach to
modifications. Treating the consent decree first as a contract,
Justice White noted that the "'scope of a consent decree must
be discerned within its four corners, and not by reference to
what might satisfy the purposes of one of the parties to it' or by
what 'might have been written had the plaintiff established his
factual claims and legal theories in litigation'."54 Given that the
decree mentioned neither layoffs, demotions nor "an intention to
depart from the existing seniority system or from the City's arrangements with the Union, '55 the majority could not "believe
that the parties to the decree thought that the City would simply disregard . . . the seniority system it was then following."5
The majority ignored the dissenting argument raised by Justice
Blackmun for himself and Justices Brennan and Marshall that,
in the context of the complex and lengthy process of implementing a civil rights action, leaving the trial court discretion to handle unforeseen circumstances was not a rewriting of the parties'
agreement, but was part of the attempt to implement the writ57
ten terms.

" Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1982).
" Stotts, 467 U.S. at 573 (quoting United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673,
681-82 (1971)). Armour was the fifth time the meatpackers decree was before the Court.
See HANDLER, supra note 14, at 9321 n.126.
11 467 U.S. at 573. Justice Stevens's concurring opinion also rested on a similar rationale. Id. at 590-92 (Stevens, J., concurring).
" Id. at 575. Justice White also noted that it was not likely that the City would
have bargained away seniority rights since neither the union nor the non-minority employees were parties when the 1980 consent decree was entered. Id. at 575-76. Justice
O'Connor emphasized this point in her concurring opinion. Id. at 587-88 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Subsequently, the Court has taken an even stronger approach to protecting
the rights of non-parties. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (non-parties cannot be
bound in either a formal or practical sense by a consent decree). But see Civil Rights Act
of 1991, PUB. L. No. 102-166, § 108 (reversing Martin under limited circumstances).
5 Stotts, 467 U.S. at"609. The majority also ignored the dissent's important point
that the case was being reviewed after the trial court had issued a preliminary injunction, not a permanent injunction. The trial court was entitled to extra deference in this
context. Id. at 610; see infra note 154 with accompanying text; see also American Hosp.
Supply Corp. v. Hospital Prods., Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 594-95 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.)
(noting the substantial deference due the trial court "in the hectic atmosphere of a pre-
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Justice White also explained that the trial court did not
have inherent power to modify the consent decree in response to
the unexpected financial crisis: "Title VII necessarily acted as a
limit on the District Court's authority to modify the decree over
the objections of the City; the issue cannot be resolved solely by
reference to the terms of the decree and notions of equity."' 8
Under the interpretation of title VII the Court had provided in
InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,9 the

district court could not alter the seniority system in this context
unless it made a finding either that the seniority system was
adopted with discriminatory intent or that it could not make
whole a proven victim of discrimination without such an
alteration. °
Stotts is generally recognized as the Supreme Court's
missed opportunity to clarify the rules for modifications, especially in the institutional reform context." Most lower courts
have read Stotts as a decision based largely on the special pro62
tections that title VII provides bona fide seniority systems.
Since the Supreme Court did not make the overall standards explicit, whatever the Court's actual intent, the case has been
overlooked for its effects on the law of modification of
injunctions.63

liminary-injunction proceeding").
I Stotts, 467 U.S. at 576 n.9.
59 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
'0 Stotts, 467 U.S. at 576 n.9. The dissent objected that in the context of a preliminary injunction to modify a consent decree, it was impossible for a court to know the
extent and nature of any past discrimination by the City. The parties had never been to
trial on these claims in either the original action leading to the consent decree or in this
action seeking modification. Id. at 609. The Court later clarified that despite Stotts, a
district court could enter a consent decree that benefitted individuals who were not actual victims of an employer's discriminatory practices despite title VII's apparent restrictions. The majority distinguished those situations where a district court would be barred
by title VII from providing such relief, "after a trial or, as in Stotts, in disputed proceedings to modify a decree." Local No. 93 v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 529 (1986).
" See, e.g., Jost, supra note 6, at 1123 ("Stotts illustrates the confusion resulting
from the variety of judicial approaches to modification that have evolved since Swrift");

Modification of Consent Decrees, supra note 6, at 1032 n.79 trevie%%ing differing ways
commentators have evaluated Stotts).
61 See, e.g., Deveraux v. Geary, 765 F.2d 268 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S.
1021 (1986); Wilmington Firefighters v. City of Wilmington, 632 F. Supp. 1177, 1185 (D.
Del. 1986) (collecting cases).
0' See, e.g., SCHOENBROD ET AL..supra note 4, at 246 n.1; The Supreme Court, 1933
Term-Leading Cases, 98 HARV. L. REV. 87, 267 (1984) [hereinafter Leading Cases].
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THE FLEXIBLE TEST

For several years some commentators and courts have contended that, at least in the context of institutional reform litigation, a strict interpretation of Swift is inappropriate. They have
called for flexibility based on a variety of factors.6 4 Professor
Owen Fiss is perhaps the most well-known commentator embracing the flexible approach. He has noted that in an institutional reform case, the remedial phase "is concerned not with
the enforcement of a remedy already given, but with the giving
or shaping of the remedy itself. ...

The task is to remove the

condition that threatens the constitutional values."65 Professor
Fiss focused on effective enforcement of constitutional rights
through necessarily complex, on-going involvement of the trial
court in shaping the relief. In some cases a flexible approach
seems warranted. For example, in Philadelphia Welfare Rights
Organization v. Shappe6 the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
had agreed to provide 180,000 medical examinations to welfare
recipients or face substafitial penalties. When the numerical

84

Professor Timothy Jost has probably done the most thorough job of assessing the

situations where courts should find it appropriate to permit modifications: "[W]hen necessary to accommodate a change of the law or legally material change of fact, to relieve
the obligor from oppression, to effectuate the rights of the beneficiary, or, in certain
cases, to protect the public interest, a court should be open to modification." Jost, supra
note 6, at 1162.
Professor Jost has also categorized a large number of cases adopting a flexible approach to modifications. Id. at 1113 n.84. See also Brian Landsberg, The Desegregated
School System and the RetrogressionPlan, 48 LA. L. REv. 789 (1988); Steinberg, supra
note 6, at 71-73 (both advocating an ad hoc approach to modification based on large
numbers of factors); Edward A. Tomlinson, Modification and Dissolution of Administrative Orders and Injunctions, 31 MD. L. REV. 312, 326 (1971) (same). But see Hugh J.
Beard, The Role of Res Judicatain Recognizing Unitary Status and Terminating Desegregation Litigation: A Response to the Structural Injunction, 49 LA. L. REv. 1239,
1241-42 (1989) ("[1]ogically and necessarily flowing ... is the preclusion of a continuing
and flexible modification of the decree"); Modification of Consent Decrees, supra note 6,
at 217 (rejecting the flexible approach because it allows political considerations to affect
judicial decisions on modification).
1 Owen Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term-Foreword:The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1, 27 (1979). Professor Fiss's view has been expressly adopted by some
judges. See, e.g., Rule v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748, 770 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Battle v. Anderson, 708 F.2d 1523, 1538 (10th Cir. 1983) (McKay, J.,
concurring), cert. dismissed, 465 U.S. 1014 (1984). Professor Abram Chayes is another
preeminent professor also closely associated with this position. Abram Chayes, The Role
of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1298-1302 (1976) (advocating flexible, on-going relief with the judge's active participation).
66 602 F.2d 1114 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1026 (1980).
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quota could not be met because the welfare population went
down, the court approved a request for modification of the consent decree because it made little sense to enforce the penalty
when the actual purpose of the decree-a minimal level of
health care for people on welfare-was being met.67
A. Judge Friendly's Case for Flexibility
Before Rufo, the leading case adopting the flexible approach
to modifications in the institutional reform context was New
York State Association for Retarded Children v. Carey. 8 Carey
was a class action brought on behalf of mentally retarded residents of the Willowbrook State School in New York City. A consent judgment entered in 1975 committed the defendants to reduce the population of Willowbrook from 5700 to 250 by
relocation of the residents to community placements."" Despite
extensive efforts to enforce the consent judgment, as of mid1981, 999 members of the original class had been transferred
temporarily to other large institutions, and another 1369 members still remained at Willowbrook. 70 When the plaintiffs moved
for an order declaring the defendants out of compliance with
portions of the consent judgment, the defendants responded in
part by seeking modification of the fifteen-bed/ten-bed limitation to a fifty-bed limitation. After hearing twenty-five days of
testimony on these motions, the district court held that the defendants were not in compliance with provisions of the consent
judgment, appointed a special master to protect classmembers
from harm and rejected the defendants' request for modification, which would allow the use of larger facilities.'
The district court rejected the request to modify for several
reasons. The plaintiffs' expert witnesses persuaded the court
Id. at 1120-21.
68706 F.2d 956 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915 (1983). For background on the
case, see DAVID J. ROTHMAN & SHEILA 1M,RoTHmAN. THE WILLOWI3ROOK WNARs(1984);
Philip P. Frickey & David L Levine, Book ReLiew, 3 CoNsTr Commt 270 (1986) (reviewing
Rothman & Rothman).
69 Community placements were to be in non-institutional residences located in residential facilities with a size limitation known as the "fifteen-bed/ten-bed limitation."
Those with multiple handicaps were to be placed in facilities with a "six-bed/three-bed
limitation." 706 F.2d at 959.
70 Id. at 960.
7! New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 551 F. Supp. 1165
(E.D.N.Y. 1982).
'7
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that the needs of the class members were better met in group
homes than in larger facilities and that placement in small facilities was "still an important goal" of the consent judgment.7 2 Although the court recognized that the defendants' difficulties in
finding suitable small facilities in the tight New York City housing market warranted an extension of time for transferring the
remaining class members, the court noted that at least in part
the defendants had created their own obstacles to finding placements.73 Relying on a rigid reading of Swift, the district court
concluded that the defendants had "failed to show exceptional
circumstances or any grievous wrong as a basis for relief. ' 74 In
the district court's view, "[i]t would seem to be elementary that
a party cannot show changed conditions created by its own misconduct, or by a change in its own theories or thinking as justi'7 5
fying modification.
In reviewing the decision on appeal, the Second Circuit upheld most of the district court's decision, but reversed its refusal
to modify the consent judgment's fifteen-bed/ten-bed limitation.7 6 Writing for the panel, Judge Henry Friendly reviewed the
evidence supporting the defendants' "strong showing that only
by modifying the fifteen-bed/ten-bed limitation . . . could they
expeditiously relocate the remaining . . . residents. '77 Judge
Friendly did not review the trial court's rejection of this evidence in favor of the plaintiff's case under the standard
tests-whether the findings of fact were clearly erroneous or
whether the conclusions were an abuse of discretion. 78 Instead,
he framed the inquiry under the most flexible language from
Justice Cardozo's opinion in Swift 79 and rejected the trial court's
72 Id. at 1184. The defendants also offered extensive expert testimony to buttress

their claims that class members could receive equally good or even superior care in larger
facilities. Id. at 1181-84.
71 Id. at 1188-90.
71 Id. at 1191. The district court cited the Second Circuit as having endorsed Swift's
stringent test. Id. at 1190-91 (quoting Chance v. Board of Examiners, 561 F.2d 1079,
1086 (2d Cir. 1977)).
551 F. Supp. at 1191.
76 Carey, 706 F.2d 965, 971 (2d Cir. 1983).
• Id. at 965-67.
78 The court used these standards in evaluating other portions of the lower court's
decision. Id. at 962, 965. See also Evan Tsen Lee, PrincipledDecision Making and the
ProperRole of Federal Appellate Courts: The Mixed Questions Conflict, 64 S. CAL. L.
REV. 235 (1991) (scope of review of institutional reform litigation decisions).
" Carey, 706 F.2d at 967, quoting United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114
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reliance on Justice Cardozo's stricter language.3 0 Judge Friendly
rightly pointed out that Swift's language had to be read in the
context of that case.
Turning to the context of the case at hand, Judge Friendly
acknowledged that although the defendant was seeking modification, "it [was] not, as in Swift, in derogation of the primary
objective of the decree." 8 ' In Judge Friendly's view, the primary
objective was to empty "mammoth" Willowbrook; the fact that
the modification would counter another objective, placing residents "in small facilities bearing some resemblance to a normal
home"" was just a consequence of the modification.83 Judge
Friendly found a closer analogy between Carey and his own majority opinion in King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Industries, Inc.,84 than between Carey and either Swift8" or United
Shoe. 6 In King-Seeley the Second Circuit acknowledged that
Swift must be read in context. Thus, "[w]hen a case involves
drawing a line between legitimate interests on each side, modification will be allowed on a lesser showing." 8
Judge Friendly pointed to two other factors that supported
his conclusion that a more flexible standard was appropriate in

(1932) ("A continuing decree of injunction directed to events to come is subject always to
.
adaptation as events may shape the need .
,0 Carey, 706 F.2d at 967-968.
"

82

Id. at 969.
Id.

Id. ("any modification will perforce alter some aspect of the decree").
418 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1969).
- 367 U.S. 909 (1961); see supra notes 37-38 & accompanying text.
88 391 U.S. 244 (1968); see supra notes 41-44 & accompanying text.
Carey, 706 F.2d at 969. Judge Friendly went on to quote from King-Seeley
While changes in fact or in law afford the clearest bases for altering an injunction, the power of equity has repeatedly been recognized as extending also to
cases where a better appreciation of the facts in light of experience indicates
that the decree is not properly adapted to accomplishing its purposes.
Id. at 969 (quoting King-Seeley, 418 F.2d at 35).
King-Seeley was a dispute "between two kinds of right-doing, King-Seeley's legitimate interest in protecting its trademark [in the capitalized word "Thermos"] insofar as
this is valid and Aladdin's equally legitimate interest in being free to sell its products by
use of a generic term ["thermos" as a lower case word]." 418 F.2d at 35. Judge Friendly
pointed out that the injunction gave the defendant equitable relief and that the case
could have easily arisen with the parties in reversed positions. Id. He did not answer
directly the charges of the dissenting judge who asserted that Judge Friendly simply had
substituted himself for the trial judge in making findings of fact and also had overruled a
unanimous affirmance of the original decree by another panel of the court. Id. at 37
(Moore, J., dissenting).
83
84
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this case. First, he quoted extensively from several sources, including Professors Chayes and Fiss, to support his general conclusion that
in institutional reform litigation such as this judicially-imposed remedies must be open to adaptation when unforeseen obstacles present
themselves, to improvement when a better understanding of the problem emerges, and to accommodation of a wider constellation of interests than is represented in the adversarial setting of the courtroom. 8

Thus, in Judge Friendly's view, "a consensus is emerging among
commentators in favor of modification with a rather free
hand."s"
Second, in this case in particular, "especially great generosity [was] mandated" because of a then-recent Supreme Court
decision, Youngberg v. Romeo.9 0 Judge Friendly believed that
under Youngberg the district court was not free to choose between the testimony offered by the witnesses for the plaintiffs
and the defendants. The lower court could only determine
whether the defendants' request for modification to use larger
facilities "constituted 'professionally acceptable choices'." 1
Judge Friendly rejected the position expressed by the United
States as amicus curiae that the defendants had already and irrevocably exercised their professional judgment in agreeing to
the terms of the consent decree because their agreement was
based on the mistaken belief that small facilities could be

88 Carey, 706 F.2d at 969.

89Id. at 970. See id. at 971 ("Applications to modify a decree such as that in this
case should thus be viewed with generosity.").
80 457 U.S. 307 (1982). Youngberg, which was decided two months after the district
court ruled in Carey, concerned a suit for damages brought by a retarded man who had
been committed to a state-run institution and allegedly had received inadequate treatment. In deciding whether the defendant state officials were liable, the Supreme Court
emphasized that:
Courts must show deference to the judgment exercised by a qualified professional .... [Tihe decision, if made by a professional, is presumptively valid;
liability may be imposed only when the decision by the professional is such a
substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the
decision on such a judgment.
Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 322-23 (quoted in Carey, 706 F.2d at 965, 971). For a recent
critical assessment of the professional judgment standard, see Susan Stefan, Leaving
Civil Rights to the "Experts". From Deference to Abdication Under the Professional
Judgment Standard, 102 YALE L.J. 639 (1992).
91Carey, 706 F.2d at 971.
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found. 92 The Second Circuit panel remanded the case to the district court on the narrow question of whether the defendants'
the
experts had exercised professional judgment in supporting
3
request for modification to allow a fifty-bed limit.0

B.

The Brooklyn Critics

The Carey decision was severely criticized in the Brooklyn
Law Review by Steven R. Shapiro, Esquire,9 ' and a student note
author.9 5 The Brooklyn critics faulted Judge Friendly's Second

Circuit opinion for several reasons. In their views: (1) Judge
Friendly relied inappropriately on precedent, specifically United
Shoe, Youngberg and King-Seeley; (2) the court failed to explain why it overruled the district court's determination of the
primary objective of the decree; (3) the opinion improperly assumed that professional judgment rather than the foreseeable
difficulties in finding housing was the basis for the defendants'
motion to modify; (4) Judge Friendly ignored the distinctions
between the standards for issuing a consent decree originally
and modifying it later; (5) the court made inappropriate use of
scholarly commentators on institutional reform litigation, especially Professor Owen Fiss, whose clear focus in his writings is on
the need to use flexibility as a means of enforcing decrees effectively; and (6) the appellate court used an improper standard for
reviewing a denial of a request for relief under rule 60(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.96 Despite the significant criticisms raised by the Brooklyn critics, however, the Carey opinion
has enjoyed wide acceptance in federal courts over the past
decade.97
Id.
Id.
" Shapiro, supra note 6, at 433. At the time he wrote, Mr. Shapiro was a staff attorney for the New York Civil Liberties Union, attorneys for the plaintiff class in Carey.
Shapiro had no direct role in the case, however. Id. at 459 n.*.
Keeble, supra note 6, at 657.
A student writing in another scholarly publication has made similar criticisms of
Carey in reliance on the work of the Brooklyn critics. Murphy, supra note 6, at 203.
97 All courts in the Second Circuit have followed Carey without questioning its
premises. See, e.g., Kozlowski v. Coughlin, 871 F.2d 241, 246-47 (2d Cir. 1959) (stating
that under Carey and Swift, however, the "guiding principle" was that modification was
favored when necessary to carry out the purposes of the decree); Tetra Sales (U.S.A.) v.
T.FH. Publications, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). Other federal courts have
also adopted the Carey approach. See, e.g., Plyler v. Evatt, 846 F.2d 208 (4th Cir.), cert.
92
93
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THE SUPREME COURT'S APPROACH TO MODIFICATIONS IN
INSTITUTIONAL REFORM LITIGATION

A. The Adoption of Carey in Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk
County Jail
The Carey opinion achieved even greater significance when
the Supreme Court relied heavily on it in Rufo v. Inmates of
Suffolk County Jail,98 its most recent opinion on the modification of consent decrees in institutional reform cases. Rufo began
in 1971 when inmates sued the sheriff of Suffolk County, Massachusetts and other state and local officials, alleging that pretrial
detainees were being held under unconstitutional conditions.
1. The Background of Rufo
In 1973 District Judge Robert Keeton agreed that conditions in the facility, the Charles Street Jail, which had been
built in Boston in 1848, were constitutionally deficient under the
Due Process Clause of the'Fourteenth Amendment. The district
court issued a permanent injunction which prohibited pretrial
detainees from being double-celled after November 30, 1973 and
would prohibit their incarceration at the jail after June 30, 1976.
This order was not appealed.99 In 1978, with the problems still
not solved, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's subsequent orders. It declared that the jail would be closed on October 2, 1978, unless an acceptable plan for creating a proper facility was presented to the district court before that date. 100 The
defendants met this deadline in substance; °10 seven months
later, the district court entered a consent decree which included
plans for a new jail housing 309 detainees in single occupancy
rooms.
Construction on the new jail did not even begin until more
than one year after the projected completion date. Since growth
denied, 488 U.S. 897 (1988); Heath v. DeCourcy, 888 F.2d 1105 (6th Cir. 1989); Newman
v. Graddick, 740 F.2d 1513 (11th Cir. 1984). Some courts have not found it necessary to
decide whether to follow Carey or Swift. See, e.g., Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 861 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Ruiz v. Lynaugh, 811 F.2d 856 (5th Cir. 1987).
98 112 S. Ct. 748 (1992).
" Id.
at 754.
'oo Id. at 755 (quoting Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, 573 F.2d 98, 99100 (1st Cir. 1978)).
101 112 S. Ct. at 755.
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in the inmate population had in the meantime, outpaced the
projections, the defendants were ordered to build a larger jail by
the state court in a separate action. 02 The district court subsequently modified the decree in 1985 to allow the capacity to be
increased to any amount on the condition that "single-cell
occu1 03
facility."
the
for
design
the
under
pancy is maintained
While the jail was under construction in 1989, the Suffolk
County sheriff moved to modify the decree to allow some double
celling of detainees. The sheriff contended that the motion was
supported by both a change in law and a change in fact. The
asserted change in law was the Supreme Court's decade-old
opinion in Bell v. Wolfish,c°4 which held that double celling was
not unconstitutional per se. The asserted change in fact was the
increase in the population of pretrial detainees the jail had
experienced.
Judge Keeton refused to grant the request for modification
because the sheriff had not met the "grievous wrong" standard
from Swift. In the district court's view, Bell did not overrule any
legal interpretation that formed the basis for the 1979 consent
decree. As for the increase in the jail population, it was "neither
new nor unforeseen.

10

5

The court also stated that even under a

flexible modification standard, as adopted in Carey, the sheriff
would not be permitted to introduce double celling. According to
Judge Keeton, who had handled the case for years, a separate
cell "has always been an important element of the relief sought
in this litigation-perhaps even the most important element." 0 6
The First Circuit affirmed. 0 In Rufo the Supreme Court
reversed.108

102

Id. at 756.

203

Id.

-- 441 U.S. 520 (1979). The Supreme Court handed down Bell just one week after
Judge Keeton had approved the consent decree in 1979. See Ruto, 112 S. Ct. at 756.
"05 Rufo, 112 S. CL at 756 (quoting Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, 734
F. Supp. 561, 564 (D. Mass. 1990)).
106 112 S. Ct. at 756-57 (quoting Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, 734 F.
Supp. 561, 565 (D. Mass. 1990)).
107 Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, 915 F.2d 1557 (lst Cir. 1990).
10.

112 S. Ct. 748 (1992).
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The Supreme Court's Rufo Decision
a. The Majority

Writing for a majority of five,10 9 Justice White noted that
even though a consent decree was "in some respects contractual
in nature," the parties "desire and expect" that the decree will
be enforceable as a judicial decree. 110 As such, the decree is subject to rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Although the district court had recognized these facts, Justice
White stated that it was error to hold that rule 60(b)(5) was
nothing but a codification of the "grievous wrong" standard of
Swift."'
After detailing the history of the Swift litigation, Justice
White cited Carey as a leading case, recognizing that Justice
Cardozo's language read out of context suggested a "hardening"
of the traditional flexible standard for modification of consent
decrees.1 2 Moreover, other decisions of the Supreme Court itself
"reinforce[d] the conclusion that the 'grievous wrong' language
of Swift was not intended to take on a talismanic quality, warding off virtually all efforts to modify consent decrees.""13 Justice
White underscored that the terms of rule 60(b) permitted "a less
stringert, more flexible standard.""' 4 Relying again on Carey,
Justice White noted that "[t]he upsurge in institutional reform
litigation since [Brown 1] has made the ability of a district court
to modify a decree in response to changed circumstances all the
more important."" 5
"'9Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Souter joined the
opinion. Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Stevens wrote a dissent,
which Justice Blackmun joined. Justice Thomas took no part in the case, which was
argued before he joined the bench. Id.at 754.
110 Id. at 757.
"I Id.
112 Id.

at 757-58.
Id.at 758. Justice White cited only two cases for this point: Railway Employees
v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642 (1961) and Board of Education v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
Although both opinions cited Swift,-neither precisely applies to the situation in Ruo,In
Railway Employees the Supreme Court held that the district court had to modify a
decree that tracked then-existing labor laws after Congress amended the particular statute in question. 364 U.S. at 651. Dowell concerned a motion to dissolve a desegregation
decree after the terms of the decree had been satisfied. See infra note 125.
"' Rufo, 112 S. Ct. at 758.
115 Id. Justice White also rejected the contention that a flexible standard would deter negotiated settlements. Id. at 758-59.
1"I
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Justice White then explained that even though a district
court should be flexible in considering requests for modification
of institutional reform decrees, "it does not follow that a modification will be warranted in all circumstances.",u' Relief is appropriate under rule 60(b)(5) when it is no longer equitable, not
"when it is no longer convenient to live with the terms of a consent decree. '117 According to the majority, a party seeking modi-

fication has the burden of establishing that "a significant change
in circumstances warrants revision of the decree."", Once this
burden is met, a district court must consider whether the proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed circumstance.119 The Court then specified that the initial burden can be
met by showing a significant change in either factual conditions
or in the law.
Changed factual conditions could make compliance inequitable where the decree proves to be unworkable due to unforeseen obstacles12 ° or when enforcement without modification
would be detrimental to the public interest. Justice White rejected a proposed test that would allow modification only when a
change in facts is both "unforeseen and unforeseeable."' ' 2' He
noted that such a standard would be even more rigid than Swift.
He acknowledged that "[o]rdinarily... modification should not
be granted where a party relies upon events that actually were
anticipated at the time it entered into a decree." 2 Justice
White did not state expressly what a court should do when the
facts were subjectively unforeseen but reasonably foreseeable.
The clear implication, however, is that flexibility is called for in
116Id. at 760.

Id.
Id.
In a footnote the Court specified that this standard applied to modification of a
term of a consent decree that "arguably relates to vindication of a constitutional right."
Id. at 760 n.7. Such a showing is not necessary to implement minor changes in extraneous details such as the paint color of a building facade. If such minor changes cannot be
handled by consent, the district court would be directed to grant the change if the moving party had a reasonable basis for the request. Id. The Court did not explain how to
distinguish between the two situations or what test to apply when the motion to modify
concerned something that fell between the two extremes.
120 The Court cited to Carey as an example. Id. at 760.
121 Id. at 760.
I2 Id. "[T]hat party would have to satisfy a heavy burden to convince a court that
it agreed to the decree in good faith, made a reasonable effort to comply ith the decree,
and should be relieved of the undertaking under Rule 60(b)." Id. at 761.
117

11

1260
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that situation. 2 '
Changes in the law could also be the basis for a modification. Justice White identified one situation where modification
was clearly required-if an obligation imposed on the parties becomes impermissible under federal law. 1 24 He also stated that
modification might be warranted when the statutory or decisional law has changed to make legal what the decree was
designed to prevent. 2 5 Justice White rejected the defendants'
claim that Bell v. Wolfish'26 was a change in the law requiring
modification. Bell neither banned double celling nor did it cast
doubt on the legality of single celling. Moreover, the defendants
"were undoubtedly aware that Bell was pending when they
signed the decree.''127 Justice White also noted that the parties
were free to enter into a settlement that committed the defendants to do more than the Constitution required.
The majority recognized that there was a risk that the unceasing stream of clarifications of the law inherent in the legal
system would open the door to constant relitigation, undermine
finality and discourage parties from settling their differences. To
avoid this, Justice White stated that decisions merely clarifying
the law, rather than changing it, generally could not be the basis
for a modification motion. On the other hand, a clarifying decision could be the basis for a motion for modification if it turned
out that the parties had based their agreement on a misunderstanding of the governing law. Justice White suggested that
'123
"We note that the dissent's 'reasonably foreseeable' standard differs significantly
from that adopted by the Court today." Id. at 761 n.10. In the absence of a clear written
agreement and a fully developed record, the Court was not willing to impose sole responsibility on a local governmental entity for responding to any "reasonably foreseeable"
increase in the detainee population by increasing the capacity of the jail, "potentially
infinitely." Id.
124 Id. at 762.
121 Id. citing Railway Employees, 364 U.S. 642 (1961) and Stotts, 467 U.S. 661
(1984); see supra notes 45-57 and accompanying text. Curiously, this is the only citation
to Stotts, Justice White's then-most recent majority opinion on modification of a consent
decree in an institutional reform case. It is somewhat strange that Justice White made
no effort to distinguish the rigid approach he took in Stotts, which rebuffed the plaintiff's efforts to seek a modification to deal with an unforeseen (but probably foreseeable)
event, a layoff of employees, with the flexible approach he took in Rufe, which assisted
the defendant who sought a modification to deal with a foreseeable and probably foreseen event, an increased jail population.
126441 U.S. 520 (1979).
127 112 S. Ct. at 762.
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Rufo could be such a case if the defendants could establish that
the parties had thought that single celling was constitutionally
mandated at the time they entered into the decree.1 28

Once the moving party has met its burden of establishing a
change of law or fact warranting modification, the Court directed the lower court to decide whether the proposed modification was "suitably tailored" to the changed circumstance.1 29 This
inquiry should be guided by three factors: (1) the modification
would not create or perpetuate a constitutional violation; (2) a
proposed modification should address the problems created by
the change in circumstances and should not attempt to rewrite
the decree so that it conforms to the constitutional floor; and (3)
federalism requires deference to local governmental administrators where the changed condition made it substantially more onerous and expensive to comply with the decree. 30
b.

The Separate Opinions in Rufo

In their separate opinions, Justice O'Connor, concurring,
and Justice Stevens (joined by Justice Blackmun), dissenting,
make clear their approval of the adoption of a flexible standard
for modification of consent decrees in institutional reform
cases. 3 ' They wrote separately from the majority to clarify their
differences on other points.
In Justice O'Connor's view, the Court's new standard was
no clearer than the general language of rule 60(b)(5). She would
have simply reviewed the district court's exercise of the discretion permitted under the rule. She believed that the majority's
opinion could be understood to say that, in this case, the district
128 Id. at 763. Justice White noted that the decree stated that it "sets forth a program which is both constitutionally adequate and constitutionally required." Id.
129 Id.

130 Id. at 763-64. In a footnote added to respond to Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion, Justice White clarified that no deference was involved in the first step of the
inquiry-whether there had been a significant change of law or fact. In the second step,
however, "principles of federalism and simple common sense" required giving significant

weight to views of the officials who had to implement the decree. Id. at 764 n.14. Justice
White did not elaborate on exactly how principles of federalism might have an effect in
this context. For one attempt to do so, see Alan Effron, Note, Federalism and Federal
Consent Decrees Against Governmental Entities, 88 COLUM L REv 1796 (1988).
131 Justice O'Connor approved of the majority's rejection of the strict language of
Swift. 112 S. Ct. at 766 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Stevens specifically agreed
with the majority's "endorsement" of Carey. Id. at 768 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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court had taken too narrow a view of the permissible discretion
in three ways. First, the district court was wrong to think that
under Swift "new and unforeseen conditions" were a prerequisite to any modification. Modification could still be equitable
under the rule even if the rise in prison population had been
foreseen; the danger to the public from the pretrial release of
inmates might outweigh the failure to accommodate even a foreseen increase in the jail population. 132 Second, the district court
was wrong to flatly reject fiscal constraints as a reason to modify. Although lack of resources cannot excuse a failure to obey
constitutional requirements, it could be the basis for concluding
that the decree was no longer equitable. For example, the costs
of implementing the decree may have turned out to be far
greater than anyone had expected. 133 Third, by rejecting the proposed modification on the ground that it would "'set aside obligations of that decree,'

"134

the district court had established a

test that made it impossible to ever modify a decree,
Although Justice O'Connor supported the majority's position on these points, she expressed concern that the Court had
placed unnecessary new constraints on the district court's discretion. She thought that the majority's opinion might be read
to suggest that the district court could not conclude on remand
that it would be inequitable to double cell the plaintiffs.3' She
also thought that the majority was wrong to suggest that the district court had to defer to local officials when deciding whether
131 Id.
at 766 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor did not explain how there
would be danger to the public from releasing class members who were pretrialdetainees,
i.e., people who might not have made bail for a variety of reasons (such as poverty), but
who nonetheless were entitled to the legal presumption of innocence. See also Duran v.
Elrod, 760 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J.) (allowing modification to protect public
on the same basis).
"'1 112 S. Ct. at 766 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
131 Id. (quoting Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, 734 F. Supp. 561, 565 (D.
Mass. 1990)).
,31Although Justice O'Connor acknowledged that the district court might have
meant merely that the plaintiffs would not have agreed to the consent decree originally
without the provision on single celling, she felt that she had to take the lower court at its
word. 112 S. Ct. at 766 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
138 While she agreed that modification of just one term of a decree did not automatically defeat the purpose of the decree, she could not agree with the proposition that a
single modification could never defeat the decree's purpose. Id. at 767 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). In this case, the district court had recognized single ceiling as "perhaps even
the most important element" in the decree. Id. at 759.
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and how to modify the decree, especially in a case where the
defendants did not have
a "model record of compliance with
37
orders.'
court
previous
Although Justice Stevens endorsed the Court's adoption of
Carey, he dissented because he concluded that even under Carey's standard the district court's refusal to modify should have
been affirmed.12 8 His dissent focused on the context of the case,
which was a motion to modify the 1979 consent decree, as modified and reaffirmed in 1985, entered after litigation had established a serious constitutional violation and five years of noncompliance with an injunction. The basic task of the district
court and the parties was to fashion the "best" remedy in a complex situation where there was no way to quantify the constitutional values at issue. 139 The parties arrived at a constitutionally
adequate remedy. There was no basis to assume that the parties
(mistakenly or otherwise) believed that any single provision of
the decree, including the prohibition against double celling, was
constitutionally required.
Moreover, because the decree already had been modified in
1985, the defendants had to point to conditions of law or fact
that had changed since that time to justify further modification.
Bell v. Wolfish'40 did not qualify as a change of law because it
was pending when the decree was entered in 1979;"1 its meaning

117

130.

Id. at 767 (O'Connor, J., concurring). For the Court's response, see supra note

Justice Stevens noted that the district court already had applied Carey's flexible
standard as an alternate holding. Id. at 768 n.1 (Stevens, J., di'enting). Justice
O'Connor was careful to point out that the Court had found fault with the district
court's method only; on remand, the district court was free to come to the same conclusion as had Justice Stevens. Id. at 766 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
"I0
Id. at 769-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In a long footnote Justice Stevens explained that "[i]t
is the difficulty in determining prospectively which remedy is best that
justifies a flexible standard of modification." Id. at 770 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He
quoted the passage in Judge Friendly's opinion in Corey that had quoted Professor Fiss
approvingly. Id. at 770 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Unlike Judge Friendly, however, see
supra notes 88-89, Justice Stevens understood and adopted Professor Fis's perspective,
see supra note 65. "The justification for modifying a consent decree is not that the decree did 'too much,' but that in light of later circumstances, a modified decree would
better achieve the decree's original goals." Id.
210 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
141 Thus, like Swift, 286 U.S. 106 (1932), in which the decree was entered while an
important case was pending, the parties in Rufo had taken the certainty of a negotiated
settlement over the gamble of waiting for the Supreme Court's pronouncement.
1"
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was certainly clear when the decree was modified in 1985.142
Similarly, although an increased population of pretrial detainees
was an unanticipated change of fact that justified the 1985 modification, it was neither a new nor unforeseen problem after that
date. 143 Justice Stevens pointed to other factors counselling
against modification in this case, including the defendants' history of noncompliance with court orders in the case and their
continued use of fiscal problems as an excuse for their unwillingness to budget funds to avoid or rectify the constitutional violations. He also relied on Judge Friendly's recognition that any
modification had to be consistent with the "central purpose" of
the decree. In Justice Stevens's view, prohibiting double celling
was a central purpose of this decree and this purpose should not
be frustrated by a modification.
3. Contrasting Rufo and Carey
The two-part test that Justice White adopted in Rufo-the
movant must show both a change in law or fact and that the
proposed modification is tailored to the changed circumstances-should be a fairly workable standard for deciding modification cases in the future. It is consistent with rule 60(b)(5)
and Swift.' 4
Rufo would have been an even better opinion, however, if it
had not placed such unquestioning reliance on Judge Friendly's
opinion in Carey. In certain important respects, Rufo is an improvement over Judge Friendly's analysis. In view of the weighty
criticism levelled at Carey by the Brooklyn critics, 14 however, it

would have been helpful for future litigants and courts if the
142 Justice Stevens underscored that Bell did not represent a policy preference for
double celling; it simply held that double celling was not unconstitutional per se. 112 S.
Ct. 771 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting). As such, it was distinguishable from System Federation v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642 (1961), which required modification of a consent decree to
reflect a policy preference that Congress had made to further the statutory purposes of
the Railway Labor Act. 112 S. Ct. at 771 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
143 Justice Stevens found the trial court's conclusion that the increase was not unforeseen amply supported by the record. He would also charge the parties "with notice of
those events that reasonably prudent litigants would contemplate when negotiating a
settlement." Id. at 771-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He clarified that he would not use
foreseeability in the tort sense of something that could conceivably arise, as the majority
had charged. Compare id. at 771 (Stevens, J., dissenting) with id. at 760.
14
See Levine, supra note 4, at 753.
'" See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
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Rufo majority had pointed out where it parted company from
Judge Friendly. 146 Without clarification, it is quite conceivable
that the Supreme Court's evident reliance on Carey will tempt
lower courts to look to Judge Friendly's opinion for guidance in
interpreting Rufo. 4 7 Furthermore, had the Court answered the
criticisms levelled at Carey, it also would have removed some
potential confusion that Rufo may create.
a.

Reliance on Precedent Regarding Modification

The Brooklyn critics demonstrated that Carey did not deal
in a persuasive fashion with the key precedent concerning modification.148 The most important example for present purposes14is9
its use of United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.
United Shoe held that it was inappropriate to use Swift's grievous wrong standard to assess a plaintiff's request to modify. It
held that under Swift a decree "may not be changed in the interests of the defendants if the purposes of the litigation as incorporated in the decree ... have not been fully achieved."15 0
Judge Friendly applied United Shoe's flexible test even though
the motion to modify in Carey came from a defendant and the
purposes of the decree had not been achieved at the time of the
request for modification.1 51 Although Rufo came to the Supreme
Court in exactly the same posture as Carey came to the Second
246 As in Swift, the unquestioned reliance on Carey may be another example of a
court being distracted by the reputation of the author of the precedent. Both the name
of the case and Judge Friendly's name are frequently invoked in Rufo. The stature of

Carey may also be attributable, in part, to the fact that it was a unanimous opinion of a
most distinguished panel; Circuit Judge Jon Newman and District Judge Charles WVzanski joined Judge Friendly's opinion in full. Coincidentally, Judge Wyzanski was the trial
judge in United Shoe who was said to have "misconceived the thrust" of Swift, United

Shoe, 391 U.S. at 248, when he denied the government's petition for modification on the
grounds that it had not met the requirements of the grievous wrong test. United States
v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 266 F. Supp. 328, 329-30 (D. Mass. 1967). Perhaps Judge
Wyzanski went along in Carey because he was "once bitten, twice shy."
147

For examples of cases relying on both Carey and Rufo, see W.L. Gore & Assocs.,

Inc. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 977 F.2d 558 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail
Deliverers' Union, 797 F. Supp. 1174 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Wyatt v. King, 1992 WL 232395

(M.D. Ala. 1992). Accord Stills Pharmacy, Inc. v. Cuomo, 981 F.2d 632 (2d Cir. 1992)
("the test articulated by the Court in Rufo does not differ significantly from the test we
articulated in Carey").
See supra notes 88-91.
391 U.S. 244 (1968).
150 Id. at 248.
148
14

" See Shapiro, supra note 6, at 470.
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Circuit, Justice White did not fully explain whether the factors
that were important to the United Shoe Court mattered any
152
longer.
This question is of special interest because Justice White
ignored his own precedent concerning the modification of consent decrees in institutional reform cases: Firefighters Local
Union No. 1784 v. Stotts.153 In Stotts the plaintiffs brought the
motion for modification, seeking to effectuate the overall purpose of the decree, which was to achieve affirmative action in the
hiring and promotion of African-American firefighters. Rather
than following United Shoe, which was on all fours with Stotts,
Justice White emphasized a strict approach to reading the consent decree. 5 4 He did not suggest in Stotts that the parties
should frame the inquiry in terms of whether layoffs were a foreseen, foreseeable or unforeseen event. It was sufficient for Justice White that within the "four-corners" of the agreement, the
consent decree did not expressly provide for layoffs. Moreover,
he simply concluded that it was not believable that the parties
thought that the city would affect its seniority system through
the consent decree.
In Rufo Justice White relied heavily upon the need for flexibility in modifying decrees in institutional reform cases. In
Stotts the dissent took that position in reaction to the rigid approach used in Justice White's majority opinion. Justice White
did not directly explain in Stotts why it was incorrect to treat
institutional reform decrees differently from other types of
cases. Although one cannot expect a majority opinion to respond
to every point made by a dissent, it is peculiar that Justice

182

Justice White simply quoted the discussion of Swift in Carey without discussing

Judge Friendly's treatment of United Shoe. Rufo, 112 S. Ct. 748, 758-59 n.6 (1992). At a
later point, Justice White said that the defendants' claim that the constitutional violation had disappeared was "not well taken." Id. at 763 n.12.
183

467 U.S. 561 (1984); see supra notes 45-60.

1" The majority's approach was so strict that it ignored the important point Justice

Blackmun made in dissent: the majority took no account of the procedural posture of the
case, which was on appeal from a preliminary injunction the district court issued to protect temporarily the terms of a consent decree. Justice Blackmun took the majority to
task for basing part of its decision on what plaintiffs had failed to prove when they had
not had an appropriate opportunity to submit their proof. In reviewing the propriety of
the district court's decision to issue a preliminary injunction, he would have focused on
what the plaintiffs might have demonstrated at a full hearing. Stotts, 467 U.S. at 611.
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White saw no need in Rufo to explain his own change of heart. 1s 5
After United Shoe an observer might have had the impression that the rule for modification was that a plaintiff seeking to
effectuate the purposes of the decree was entitled to the benefits
of a reasonably flexible modification standard, but that a defendant seeking a modification over a plaintiff's objection had to
meet Swift's stringent "grievous wrong" standard.'0 0 After Rufo
and Stotts, however, that observer might well conclude that the
new rule is that a plaintiff seeking modification has to meet an
onerous burden while a defendant enjoys the benefits of a flexible standard.1 57 Since Justice White did not discuss Stotts in
Rufo, he left himself (and the Court) open to such
misunderstanding.16 8

,'l It is especially odd that Justice White's majority opinion in Rufo provides no
explanation because, in effect, Rufo overrules the approach his majority opinion adopted
in Stotts. This difference in approach carries beyond the question of the need for flexibility. For example, in Rufo Justice White emphasized that the parties were free to agree
to do more than was constitutionally required. A modification request had to be tailored
in light of what had been agreed upon, not the constitutional floor that might have been
imposed after a case were fully litigated. 112 S. Ct. at 764. In Stotts Justice White held
that in a litigated request for modification, the district court could not grant more relief
than it could after full litigation. 467 U.S. at 576-77 n.9. Needless to say, Justice White
does not explain how his two majority opinions are to be reconciled on this point either.
M See, e.g., King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus. Inc., 418 F.2d 31, 34 (2d
Cir. 1969)(describing the district court's understanding of the rules established by Swift
and United Shoe as summarized by Judge Friendly before developing the "true holding"). Compare id. at 37 (Moore, J., dissenting) ("Nor did Judge Anderson acquire a
'rigidity' of mind by a misconstruction of the Swift and United Shoe cases. To the contrary, his analysis of these cases demonstrate that he was fully aware of the extent of
their holdings."). See also King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus. Inc., 169 U.S. Pat.
Q. 85 (D. Conn. 1970) (terms of injunction as modified after remand).
"' See, e.g., Mengler, supra note 6, at 311 ("The case law, beginning with Swift and
ending with Stotts, certainly provides evidence that ... the result always has dictated
the Court's articulation of the nature of consent decrees.").
158 Justice White could have distinguished the two cases in fairly persuasive ways.
For example, in Stotts, one party was trying to effectuate a purpose that evidently was
not and-because of the rights of unrepresented third parties that would have been implicated-really could not have been contemplated by the decree. See Martin v. Wilks,
490 U.S. 755 (1989). In contrast, in Rufo the party seeking modification clearly was attempting to effectuate an express purpose of the decree, ending unconstitutional conditions of confinement. 112 S. Ct. at 748. Or, Justice White might have pointed out that
the district court in Stotts (but not in Rufo) was particularly limited in what it was
permitted to grant in a request for modification because of the special policy preferences
that Congress had expressed in title VIL Stotts, 467 U.S. at 576-77 n.9; cf. Ruto, 112 S.
Ct. at 771 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (distinguishing the district court's authority and
duty to modify in cases where Congress has or has not expressed a policy preference).
By not making these or other distinctions, Justice White's opinion leaves the Rufo
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Determination of the "Primary Objective" of the Decree

In his commentary -on the opinion, Shapiro criticized the
Second Circuit in Carey for shifting the inquiry from whether
the purposes of the decree had been achieved to whether the
modification would be "in derogation of the [decree's] primary
objective."'I5 He pointed out that this question was posed by the
Supreme Court in neither United Shoe nor in Swift. 6 0 In Carey
Judge Friendly did not explain "the hierarchy of values [he]
ascribed to the conditions imposed by the consent judgment"
and made no attempt to reconcile his view of the "primary ob'6
jective of the consent decree with that of the district court."'
The Second Circuit simply decided the question without granting any deference to the findings of the district court on the
matter.
Rufo is subject to similar criticism. Justice White's opinion
for the majority understood the primary purpose of the decree
to be to provide a remedy for "unconstitutional conditions obtaining in the Charles Street Jail."' 2 He did not undertake to
explain why the trial court, which had handled the case for
years, was incorrect to characterize the decree as providing for
"[a] separate cell for each detainee [which] has always been an
important element of the relief sought in this litiga16 3
tion-perhaps even the most important element.

Court open to the charge that it is being result-oriented and overly deferential to local
governmental officials. This would not be the first time that such charges had been
aimed at this Court. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2619 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Power, not reason, is the new currency of this Court's
decisionmaking.").
"' Shapiro, supra note 6, at 470 (quoting Carey, 706 F.2d at 969).
Shapiro disagreed that King-Seeley, a case dealing with a modification in "morally neutral territory," was appropriate precedent for Carey, where the state defendants
were violating the constitutional rights of its citizens. Shapiro, supra note 6, at 470-71
n.59. The same is true in Rufo. 112 S.Ct. at 748. Neither Carey nor Rufo involve "the
legitimate interests of approximately equal parties." Keeble, supra note 6, at 674.
,18Shapiro, supra note 6, at 474. In Carey the question was whether the "primary
purpose" of the decree was to place the plaintiffs into small, homelike facilities (the
plaintiffs' and the trial court's view) or to get them out of the large institution (the
defendants' and Judge Friendly's view for the appellate majority). See also King-Seeley
Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus. Inc., 418 F.2d 31, 37 (2d Cir. 1969) (Moore, J., dissenting)
(objecting to Judge Friendly's majority substituting itself for the trial court).
'e2

Rufo, 112 S. Ct. at 762.

Id. at 759 (quoting 734 F. Supp. at 565). See also 112 S. Ct. at 767 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (calling for deference to district court's views on need to ban double ceiling);
112 S. Ct. at 772 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (supporting prohibition against double celling
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It would be helpful for litigants and courts to know how to
make it clear what is a (or the) "primary purpose" of the decree."' If Carey and Rufo are the guide, the considered judgment of the district court that entered the decree originally will
be insufficient. That court's judgment can be second-guessed by
the appellate court, which evidently will not be bound on this
issue by the regular deferential standards of appellate review. If
they wish to attempt to avoid this result, parties should label all
the "primary purposes" of the decree as such.' 0
c. Deference to Defendants' Judgment
Judge Friendly's opinion in Carey was criticized for giving
undue deference to the professional judgment of the defendants'
experts on the appropriateness of the requested modification to
allow plaintiffs to be placed in larger facilities. 10 Under Carey
almost any change in the defendants' attitude'1 toward any aspect of the consent decree will lead inevitably to modification if
the change in attitude can be labeled as professional judgment.
Justice White has included an element of deference in Rufo,
but it should not be as supine a standard as in Carey. Justice
White was careful to emphasize that no deference is involved in
the threshold inquiry of establishing a significant change in law
or fact warranting modification.26 8 There is an element of deference, based on, "principles of federalism and common sense"
only in the second stage, when examining whether the proposed
modification is tailored to resolve the problems caused by the

as consistent with the central purpose in the litigation).
6 Without an express joint declaration of the purposes of the decree, it is virtually
a non sequitur to say that the decree has a "purpose." As the Court pointed out over 20

years ago, only the parties have purposes and those purposes are "generally opposed to
each other." United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681 (1971). Thus, in actuality,

"the court's task is to give full effect to the judgment... without going beyond its four
corners. To interpret is to explain and elucidate, not to add to or subtract from the text."
HANDLER, supra note 14,
165 See, e.g., Stewart,

at 952.
supra note 2, at 51 (responding to Ru/o, ACLU prison lawyers
now use "cast-in-stone" language in consent decrees).
168 See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 6, at 477 ("tilt toward openendedness is decidedly
one-sided in favor of defendants"); Keeble, supra note 6, at 680-81 (questioning application of "professional judgment" standard to Carey).
11 Compare Comment, Dissolution and Modification of Federal Decrees on
Grounds of Change of Attitude, 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 659 (1958) (analyzing Fair Labor
Standards Act cases under Swift).
168112 S.Ct. 748, 764 n.14 (1992).
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changed circumstances. The basis is the defendants' primary responsibility to resolve the intricate problems in implementing an
institutional reform decree."" That this standard involves only
modest deference is underscored by Justice White's clear statements to the effect that a modification is not to be used as an
excuse to rewrite the decree to conform to the constitutional
floor or to use financial constraints as an excuse for the perpetuation of constitutional violations. 170 Only later cases will deter7
mine whether this standard strikes the appropriate balance.1 '
On its face, it seems better than the "balance" struck in
Carey.172

d. DistinguishingBetween the Standards for Modification
and Original Approval of a Consent Decree
In Carey Judge Friendly's endorsement of a flexible test
may not have distinguished properly between the standard for
issuing a decree and the stricter standard for modifying the decree under Swift. 1 3 Justice White did not make the same mis-

,'See id. at 764, citing Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955)
(Brown II); Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267,
281 (1977) (Milliken II).
...112 S. Ct. at 764 & n.14. But see id. ("To refuse modification of a decree is to
bind all future officers of the State, regardless of their view of the necessity of relief from
one or more provisions of a decree that might not have been entered had the matter been
litigated to its conclusion.").
171 For an example of an opinion written as if Rufo incorporates an extremely deferential standard, see Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Wecht, 797 F. Supp. 428 (W.D.
Pa. 1992). In 1989 the parties entered into a consent decree that committed the defendants to build a facility for the forensic mentally ill. The district court allowed modification on the grounds that the defendants' desire to follow a "popular . . . significant
change in treatment" of the mentally ill-deinstitutionalization-constituted a sufficient
change under Rufo. Id. at 435. The plaintiffs' position-that the defendants had agreed
to build the facility less than three years before-was brushed aside. The defendants
made no showing that deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill, a concept that is at least
20 years old, constituted a significant change of fact or law of the type that Rule appeared to contemplate. This case is a good example of what may happen in the future
due to Justice White's failure to differentiate expressly the Court's beliefs about deference from Judge Friendly's more extreme views about the need to bow to professional
judgment.
172 But see, e.g., 112 S. Ct. at 767 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[d]eference to one of
the parties to a lawsuit is usually not the surest path to equity"); id. at 772 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (defendants' "history of noncompliance . . . provides an added reason for
insisting that they honor their most recent commitments").
M See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 6, at 476-77; Mengler, supra note 6, at 336-45 (distinguishing approval, interpretation and modification stages). See also Humble Oil &
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take in Rufo. It is clear in the majority opinion that flexibility

applies only to resolving the problem created by changed circumstances.174 The proposed solution is to be tailored to the
problem identified; it is emphatically not an opportunity to reli-

On this point Rufo is appropriately consistent
tigate the decree.
75
with Swift.

e.

Use of Commentators on InstitutionalReform Litigation

Judge Friendly buttressed his position in Carey with a discussion of academic commentary on the standard to be applied

to modifications of institutional reform litigation.1 70 Although
academic commentators might be expected to be pleased with a
court's heavy reliance on academic commentary, in this instance
they should have been distressed. The Brooklyn critics pointed

out that Judge Friendly was wrong to conclude that "a consensus is emerging among commentators in favor of modification
with a rather free hand. 1 7 7 For example, while Judge Friendly
relied heavily on Professor Owen Fiss,17 their respective goals
for modifications were completely different. Judge Friendly focused on deference to the defendants' professional judgment
while, as is evident in the very language Judge Friendly quoted,

Ref. Co. v. American Oil Co., 405 F.2d 803, 821 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 905
(1969) ("world of difference" between original entry and modification of decree). Humble
Oil was rejected by Judge Friendly as "too severe" in King-Seeley. 418 F.2d 31, 35 n.2
(2d Cir. 1969). The Carey Court cited Humble Oil as having "steadfastly hewed to the
Swift line." 706 F.2d at 969 n.16.
174"[A] consent decree is a final judgment that may be reopened only to the extent
that equity requires." Rufo, 112 S. Ct. at 764.
175 Compare, e.g., United States v. Swift, 286 U.S. 106, 118 (1932) ("We are not
framing a decree. We are asking ourselves whether anything has happened that will justify us now in changing a decree."). For a case following Rufo that appears to have applied the standard correctly, see Lorain NAACP v. Lorain Board of Education, 979 F.2d
1141 (6th Cir. 1992) (district court's authority to impose additional obligations on defendants limited by terms of the decree; improper to change negotiated cap on state's
contribution to city's desegregation costs from $1 million to $9 million without showing
additional violation or other changed conditions).
178 Carey, 706 F.2d 956, 970-71 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915 (19$3).
177Id. at 970. Compare Keeble, supra note 6, at 677-79 (demonstrating that there
was no such consensus in the sources cited by Judge Friendly).
78 Judge Friendly stated that "[t]he best statement we have found with r(spect to
the appropriate legal standard for evaluating a defendant's motion for modification of a
consent judgment in institutional reform litigation is that of Professor Owen Fias." Carey, 706 F.2d at 970 (quoting Owen Fiss, The Supreme Court-1978 Term-Foreword:
The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L REv.1, 49 (1979)).
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the concern of Professor Fiss (and others)1 79 is the effectiveness
of the decree to achieve relief for the plaintiffs. 80
Justice White did not rely on academic commentators in
Rufo. He did rely on cases like Carey, which in turn purported
to rely on the commentary. Only Justice Stevens quoted or relied on any commentary. I'l As a result, the use (or misuse) of
academic commentary should not be a significant factor in the
future application of Rufo. At best it would have been moderately clarifying if Justice White had acknowledged that Justice
Stevens had captured the intent of Professor Fiss's remarks and
Judge Friendly had not.
f. Standard for Reviewing a Denial of Relief under Rule
60(b)
Judge Friendly rejected the traditional abuse of discretion
standard in reviewing the trial court's decision in Carey to deny
the request for modification. Instead, the court of appeals acted
as if it was free to examine the question de novo. 5 2
Justice White did not focus expressly on the issue in Rufo
because, as he framed the question for the majority, the district
court made an error of law by believing that rule 60(b)(5) had
codified Swift's "grievous wrong" standard.13 Such an error is

reviewable freely by the appellate court.18 4 In contrast, both Jus"" "The commentators instead speak generally of the need for effective, constitutionally sufficient results." Keeble, supra note 6, at 677; see id. at 676 (Judge Friendly
relied on "isolated segments from each commentary").
180 "A revision is justified if the remedy is not working effectively .... " Carey, 706
F.2d at 970 (quoting Fiss, supra note 178, at 49); see also Keeble, supra note 6, at 676
n.125 ("It is erroneous to imply that Fiss would sanction modification merely because it
is burdensome for defendants to comply with provisions necessary to protect plaintiffs'
constitutional rights.").
oe' While quoting Judge Friendly's excerpt from Professor Fiss, Justice Stevens
added language that accurately reflected Fiss's view. The quotation is sandwiched be.
tween two comments made by Justice Stevens: "It is the difficulty in determining prospectively which remedy is best that justifies a flexible standard of modification. The
justification for modifying a consent decree is not that the decree did 'too much', but
that in light of later circumstances, a modified decree would better achieve the decree's
original goals." Rufo, 112 S. Ct. 748, 770 n.2 (1992).
182 Compare Carey, 706 F.2d at 971 (embracing view of request for modification
with "generosity") with id. at 960 (rejecting claims of abuse of discretion and clearly
erroneous findings of fact on issue of defendants' noncompliance with the consent
judgment).
18s Rufo, 112 S. Ct. at 757.
18, See, e.g., J. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 13.4, at 600 (1985).
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tices O'Connor and Stevens framed the issue under the abuse of
discretion standard. 8 5 The majority did not expressly disagree
that this was the appropriate standard to apply when reviewing
a district court's decision based on a proper understanding of
the law. It probably would have been better, however, if the majority had clarified the point either by expressing agreement
with the concurrence and dissent or by noting that it was parting company with any contrary implication that might be derived from Carey.
g. Determining When the Law has "Changed"
Because of the context in which the Carey case arose,
neither Judge Friendly nor the Brooklyn critics had occasion to
consider how to determine when the law has changed to a sufficient degree that it will support a motion for modification. 8 " In
Rufo Justice White tried to establish some standards for making
this determination."8 7 It remains to be seen whether the standards that he set in Rufo will provide sufficient guidance. Probably the most difficult task for lower courts and litigants will be
to decide whether there has been a "change" in the law which
might support modification, or merely a "clarification," which
will not.18
Perhaps one reason that the majority in Rufo did not undertake to explain how to make the distinction is that in close
cases, at least, it is nearly impossible to do so. To illustrate why,
briefly consider the difficulties the Court has had in making the
same distinction in an unrelated area of the law: habeas corpus.
In Teague v. Lane' 89 and its progeny' 90 the Supreme Court has
determined that a federal "habeas [corpus] petitioner generally
cannot benefit from a new rule of criminal procedure announced
,85Rufo, 112 S.Ct. at 765 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 768 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).

IseCarey was essentially a "change of fact" case. The relevant issue was whether the
difficulties the defendants encountered in locating small community placements for the
plaintiffs constituted a sufficient change to warrant modification.
:8,See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
Rufo, 112 S. Ct at 762-3.
,89489 U.S. 288 (1989).

1"8

190 Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892 (1993); Stinger v. Black, 112 S. Ct. 1130 (1992);
Wright v. ,Vest, 112 S. CL 2482 (1992); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990); Saffle v.
Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990); Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990); Penry v. L naugh, 492

U.S. 302 (1989).
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after his conviction has become final on direct appeal." 19 1 Thus,
in many federal habeas corpus petitions, a court must determine
whether an opinion which the prisoner is relying on, but which
was released after his or her conviction became final, announced
a new rule. If the opinion did announce a new rule, it is not
retroactive and of no benefit to the prisoner. If it has merely
clarified the law or applied it in a new factual context, however,
the opinion would be retroactive. As one circuit court that has
struggled with the issue said: "the 'new rule' rule is easier to
recite than apply in most cases.... Suffice it to say that discerning the domain of a given rule and marking the precise point at
which its younger sibling, rather than it, applies is more an art
than a science."' 9 2 One commentator has called the Supreme
Court's attempts to distinguish new rules from old ones a "logical house of cards." 193
Courts faced with petitions to modify that are based on asserted changes in the law will have to deal with the same problem. Few situations will be as obvious as the one that the Rufo
Court faced: whether Bell v. Wolfish'1 4 qualified as a change in
the law requiring modification. In closer cases, it is safe to predict that courts will have some trouble making the determination.19 5 Even after deciding whether there has been a change in
Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482, 2489 (1992). See also Markus Dubber, Prudence
and Substance: How the Supreme Court's New Habeas Retroactivity Doctrine Mirrors
and Affects Substantive ConstitutionalLaw, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 n.1 (1992) (collecting commentary on Teague).
19 Taylor v. Gilmore, 954 F.2d 441, 445 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 52
(1992).
"I Dubber, supra note 191, at 19. Dubber does an excellent job of demonstrating in
detail how difficult, if not futile, it is to make sense of the Supreme Court's "new rule"
tests. "The logical relationship between precedent and the rule under observation, of
course, is no easier to capture than the precise syllogisms of judicial opinions." Id.
.9
441 U.S. 520 (1979).
'96 In Taylor v. Gilmore, 954 F.2d 441 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992),
the Seventh Circuit developed an approach to the Teague problem that might be helpful
to courts trying to apply Rufo:
[W]e adopt the following analysis when deciding whether a case announces
a new rule under Teague. First we determine whether the case clearly falls in
one category or another-if it overrules or significantly departs from precedent, or decides a question previously reserved, it is a new rule, while if it
applies a prior decision almost directly on point to a closely analogous set of
facts, it is not. Second, when the question is a close one, we will look to (1)
whether the case at issue departs from previous rulings by lower courts or state
courts, and (2) the level of generality of prior precedent in light of factual context in which that precedent arose.
'9'
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the law, courts will have to decide whether the change warrants
modification of the decree. For example, a change might not be
warranted where the defendants had voluntarily committed
themselves to do more than it turned out they were obligated to
do under the Constitution.196 In contrast, they might be entitled
to a change where they have committed themselves to do no
more than the law requires or where the court itself has issued
an injunction, which will be limited necessarily by the changing
contours of the law.1 97 Here again, the Rufo Court would have
been of great assistance to lower courts had it taken the time to
explain fully how to handle the problems that might arise in applying its tests.
IV.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF RUFO FOR OTHER INSTITUTIONAL
REFORM CASES

It is clear that Rufo has direct application to all future institutional reform cases. 98 In addition to relying on Carey, a case
involving the care of the mentally retarded, both Justice White's
majority opinion and Justice Stevens's dissent cited school desegregation cases such as Brown to explain why flexibility is required in the entire class of institutional reform cases. No Justice even remotely suggested that the analysis adopted in Rufo is
sui generis to prison cases.' 99
The Rufo opinion also makes it clear that Swift is still valid.
The test adopted in Rufo is consistent with the structure Justice
Cardozo established in Swift. As Professor Mengler has pointed
out, the functional characteristics of a consent decree should
guide the court in ruling on a petition to modify it.200 The parId. at 448.
199

Rufo, 112 S. CL at 762.

See, e.g., System Federation No. 91, Railway Employees Dep't, AFL-CIO v.
Wright, 364 U.S. 642 (1961).
"I, See, e.g., People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 1992 WL 184303 (N.D. M11.
1992) (school desegregation); Wyatt v. King, 1992 WL 232395 (M.D. Ala. 1992) (institutions for mentally ill and retarded). In both cases, defendants' requests for modification
were denied under Rufo.
199 Accord Lorain NAACP v. Lorain Board of Education, 979 F.2d 1141 (6th Cir.
1992) (Rufo not limited to prison reform cases and so applies to school desegregation
cases); United States v. City of Chicago, 978 F.2d 325, (7th Cir. 1992) (applying Rufo to
employment discrimination case); Epp v. Kerrey, 964 F.2d 754 (8th Cir. 1992) (applying
Rufo to abortion rights case).
200 Mengler, supra note 6, at 343-44.
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ties have chosen to avoid the uncertainties of litigation, no party
has admitted liability and both parties have compromised. 0 1
The decree is designed primarily to serve the purposes of the
parties, as articulated in the decree; in general, the parties do
not intend merely to implement the purposes of the underlying
substantive law.20 2 Justice Cardozo anticipated this situation
perfectly: "We are ndt framing a decree. We are asking ourselves
whether anything has happened that will justify us now in
20 3
changing a decree.
Rufo properly noted that Justice Cardozo distinguished between two types of decrees that parties might enter with one
another.
The distinction is between restraints that give protection to rights
fully accrued upon facts so nearly permanent as to be substantially

impervious to change, and those that involve the supervision of changing conduct or conditions and are thus provisional and tentative....
The consent is to be read as directed toward events as they were then.
It was not an abandonment of the right to exact revision in the future,
204
if revision should become necessary in adaptation to events to be.
In Swift the parties framed a decree on "facts ... substantially
impervious to change. '205 In"that specific context, the "grievous
wrong" standard was utterly appropriate. Institutional reform
decrees, such as those arising from prison reform cases like Rufo,
or school desegregation cases, are examples of the other type of
decree Cardozo identified. "A continuing decree of injunction directed to events to come is subject always to adaptation as
events may shape the need. ' 206 When a party has demonstrated
that events have shaped the need to modify an institutional re201 See, e.g., Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360, 1366 (1992); Wyatt v. King, 803 F.
Supp. 377 (M.D. Ala. 1992) (parties'may agree to terms in a consent decree that exceed
requirements of federal law).
202 In the less likely case that the injunction was entered by the court and is not a
consent decree, then a motion to modify should be tested against the purposes of the
substantive law. "A litigated decree works if the relief effectively remedies the wrong and
fails to work if the relief does not remedy the wrong. But a consent decree works if the
parties comply with its terms, and does not work if one or both parties do not comply."
Mengler, supra note 6, 344-45.
201 Swift, 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932).
204 Rufo, 112 S. Ct. 748, 758 (1992) (quoting Swift, 286 U.S. at 114-15).
205 Swift, 286 U.S. at 114.
206 Id.
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form decree, the district court should respond appropriately.2 07
In applying Swift and Rufo to a motion to modify under
rule 60(b)(5), courts need to remember that their job is to implement the parties' purposes, as expressed in the decree. In doing
so, courts need to keep in mind the "principles inherent in the

jurisdiction of chancery.

' 20

To wit, if there is doubt about the

obligations of the parties under the decree, the district court
needs to interpret the agreement and its decision should be re-

viewed on appeal under the traditional standards: free review for
questions of law, but the clearly erroneous test or the abuse of
discretion formula for other matters.2 -0 The court of appeals
should not presume lightly that it can do a better job than the
district court in interpreting the agreement of the parties. 1 0
CONCLUSION

After Rufo, how is a court to decide that the prospective
application of a decree in an institutional reform case would be
inequitable? Although its reliance on Carey is somewhat misplaced, the Rufo Court provides a workable answer to this question.2" Rufo places the burden on the party requesting modificaThere is no reason that a plaintiff cannot rely upon this standard as well. Thus,
United Shoe's call for flexibility to help a plaintiff implement the purposes of the decree
is completely valid under Rufo. United Shoe, 391 U.S. 244 (1968); see supra notes 41-44.
207

208 Swift, 286 U.S. at 114.
209 See, e.g., David I. Levine

& Hillary Salans, Exceptions to the Clearly Erroneous
Test After the Recent Amending of Rule 52(a) for the Review of Fact Based Upon
Documentary Evidence, 10 Ai. J. T&. ADvoc. 409, 431 (1987). Justices O'Connor and
Stevens properly focused in Rufo on the need to review the district court's work under
these traditional standards. Professor Mengler suggests that a district court can avoid
some of the interpretation problems by holding a "clarification hearing" at the time the
decree is approved. The record of that hearing would provide a type of legislative history
of the decree that would guide judicial interpretation in the future. Mengler, supra note
6, at 336-37. For a case that appears to have done something like what Professor Mengler
recommended, see Wyatt v. King, 803 F. Supp. 377 (M.D. Ala. 1992) (looking at the
history and terms of consent decree to determine whether modification was warranted).
. 210 Compare Rufo, 112 S. Ct. 748, 762 (1992); Carey, 705 F.2d 956, 969 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915 (1983). One exception is where the decree would ostensibly
permit the parties to do something that the law prohibits or prohibits something that the
law requires. See, e.g., Rufo, 112 S. Ct. at 762; Kasper v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 814
F.2d 332, 341-42 (7th Cir. 1987) (consent decree impermissibly called for illegal conduct).
2" See also Comment, Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jaik Modification of Consent Decrees in Institutional Reform Litigation, 26 GA. L Ray, 1025, 1042-44 (1992)
(calling Rufo a "sensible" approach because of three "distinctive traits" of institutional
reform litigation: "the speculative and complex quality of decree remedies, the status of
the government as defendant, and the probability of impact upon nonparties").
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tion to demonstrate both a significant change in circumstances
and that the proposed modification is suitably tailored to the
changed circumstance.
The major concerns raised about Carey apply to Rufo as
well. First, there is concern that the district court will be too
deferential to the professional judgment of the defendants. Second, it is possible that the appellate court will not give appropriate deference to the district court in deciding the "primary purposes" of the decree and the best way to implement those
purposes. It is too soon to tell whether these concerns will turn
out to be justified.212 Despite these concerns and those raised
about certain other aspects of the opinion,213 properly understood, the test that the Court adopted in Rufo should succeed as
a workable basic standard for deciding whether the prospective
application of any institutional reform decree is still equitable.2 14

112 It is impossible to know at this early date whether a case like Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Wecht, 797 F. Supp. 428 (W.D. Pa. 1992), is a sport or the harbinger of how lower courts will interpret Rufo. See also Leading Cases, supra note 63, at 89
(Rufo affords courts too much flexibility to modify decrees).
23
Another problem that seems to be arising is that some defendants are using Rule
as an excuse to avoid or delay their obligations under the applicable consent decrees. In
effect, they are contending that Rufe itself is a change in the law that warrants modification. See, e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 784 F. Supp. 215, 216 (E.D.
Pa. 1992) (expressing dismay at defendants' attempt to use Rufo to avoid their obligations when there is no change of law or fact).
214 There is little apparent reason why the test announced in Rufo cannot apply
generally to all requests for modification under rule 60(b)(5). See WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 8, § 2863, at 208-10 ("(O]n an adequate showing the courts will provide relief
if it is no longer equitable that the judgment be enforced, whether because of subsequent
legislation, a change in the decisional law or a change in the operative facts." (citing
modifications granted in cases of wide variety of subject matter)).
Some courts already have recognized Rufo's general application. See, e.g., Still's
Pharmacy, Inc. v. Cuomo, 981 F.2d 632 (2d Cir. 1992) (Medicaid prescription-drug pricing consent decree); United States v. Western Elec. Co., 969 F.2d 1231, 1235 n.7 (D.C.
Cir. 1992) (antitrust consent decree); Deweerth v. Baldinger, 804 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) (granting modification under Rufo due to change of law in a case involving ownership of works of art). But see W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 977 F.2d 558
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (majority in patent case relied on Carey to distinguish Rufo as applying
only to "public or service institution" cases; concurrence believes Rufe applies to all
types of cases); Justin Weaver Lilley, Comment, A Judicial Role for ProceedingsInvolving Uncontested Modifications to Existing Consent Decrees, 41 CATH. U. L. REv. 665,
667 n.9 (1992) (Swift still applies to modifications of antitrust decrees).

